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Emotion in Stories: Facial EMG
Evidence for Both Mental Simulation
and Moral Evaluation
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Facial electromyography research shows that corrugator supercilii (“frowning muscle”)
activity tracks the emotional valence of linguistic stimuli. Grounded or embodied accounts
of language processing take such activity to reflect the simulation or “reenactment” of
emotion, as part of the retrieval of word meaning (e.g., of “furious”) and/or of building a
situation model (e.g., for “Mark is furious”). However, the same muscle also expresses
our primary emotional evaluation of things we encounter. Language-driven affective
simulation can easily be at odds with the reader’s affective evaluation of what language
describes (e.g., when we like Mark being furious). To examine what happens in such
cases, we independently manipulated simulation valence and moral evaluative valence
in short narratives. Participants first read about characters behaving in a morally laudable
or objectionable fashion: this immediately led to corrugator activity reflecting positive
or negative affect. Next, and critically, a positive or negative event befell these same
characters. Here, the corrugator response did not track the valence of the event,
but reflected both simulation and moral evaluation. This highlights the importance of
unpacking coarse notions of affective meaning in language processing research into
components that reflect simulation and evaluation. Our results also call for a re-evaluation
of the interpretation of corrugator EMG, as well as other affect-related facial muscles
and other peripheral physiological measures, as unequivocal indicators of simulation.
Research should explore how such measures behave in richer and more ecologically
valid language processing, such as narrative; refining our understanding of simulation
within a framework of grounded language comprehension.
Keywords: emotion, language processing, language comprehension, embodiment and grounded cognition,
evaluation, narrative comprehension, facial EMG
INTRODUCTION
Imagine this: you walk up to your car and see a kid scratch it with a key and run off. There is a
good chance that you would be furious and frown at least a little bit as part of the expression of
that anger. Facial expression is part of our emotional evaluation of the world around us (Darwin
et al., 1998; Keltner and Ekman, 2000). Because we reliably frown more when we evaluate things
as being negative and less when we deem something positive, the corrugator supercilii muscle is
especially useful as an indicator of our emotional evaluation of things, and of how we express
that evaluation to others. Using surface facial electromyography (EMG), we can accurately record
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corrugator activity. Its strong negative linear relationship to
emotional valence, ranging from positive to negative, makes it a
reliable indicator of the emotional significance of a given stimulus
(Tassinary et al., 2000; Larsen et al., 2003).
Now consider the following sentence: “Mark is furious when
he walks up to his car and sees a kid scratch it with a key and
run off.” A number of studies have shown that simply processing
affectively salient language, even if it describes some fictional
character’s anger at their fictional car being keyed, will also evoke
corrugator activity (e.g., Foroni and Semin, 2009; Glenberg et al.,
2009; Niedenthal et al., 2009). These studies interpret the activity
of this facial muscle within the framework of grounded cognition
as language-driven simulation of what is being referred to.
Simulation, in these cases, is taken to denote the neural
reactivation of experiential traces stored from earlier perceptual,
affective, and motor experience with the world (e.g., Barsalou,
2008). Evidence for language-driven simulation has come from
various types of studies. For perceptual language, for example,
behavioral studies showed a facilitation effect for verifying
whether a picture of an eagle with wings outstretched in fact
contained an eagle. That is to say, participants were faster after
a sentence describing it in the air (e.g., “the ranger saw the
eagle in the sky”) compared to after a sentence describing it
sitting (e.g., “the ranger saw the eagle on the post”) (Zwaan
et al., 2002; Zwaan and Pecher, 2012). These results indicated
perceptual simulation of the eagle in a particular position
was part of language comprehension. Neuroimaging evidence
provided further support for such perceptual simulation. For
instance, Simmons et al. (2007) found that a verbal object-
property verification task related to color activated the same
areas of the brain involved in color perception, while a
verification task related to movement did not. While there is
an ongoing debate regarding the precise nature, and necessity,
of simulation in language comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 2016;
Leshinskaya and Caramazza, 2016), converging evidence has led
to a relative consensus on its existence. This consensus goes
beyond perceptual language alone and includes affective language
(Vigliocco et al., 2009). Much of the evidence for affective
simulation comes from facial EMG studies, such as cited above,
showing EMG activity congruent with the basic affective valence
of linguistic stimuli. One notable study by Havas et al. (2010)
even demonstrated that paralysis of the corrugator with Botox
led to slower processing of negatively valenced sentence. Within
the grounded cognition framework, corrugator activity is most
sensibly interpreted as a downstream consequence of the neural
simulation of affect (rather than as reflecting a critical role for
muscle activity itself in language processing).
A recent broad model of the interfaces between language
comprehension and emotion, the Affective Language
Comprehension (ALC) model (Van Berkum, 2018a,b), can
help us discuss the various ways in which a sentence like “Mark
is furious when. . . ” can generate an emotional state, as well as the
associated facial expression, in the reader. As shown in Figure 1,
language comprehension is assumed to involve a decoding
process in which comprehenders retrieve and grammatically
combine word meanings (and recognize other signs as well, such
as, in writing, a word printed in italics, or an exclamation mark),
and an interpretive process in which comprehenders infer the
speaker’s various intentions in the context at hand. Following
Tomasello (2008), the latter includes working out what situation
the speaker is referring to, and understanding what the speaker
wants to achieve by this. Importantly, in the ALC model, the
various representations retrieved or constructed as part of these
processes can in principle all serve as emotionally competent
stimuli (ECSs), i.e., elicit a conscious or subconscious affective
response.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the model suggests that language-
driven affective simulation might feature as part of two very
different subprocesses contributing to language comprehension.
One is the recognition and parsing of the composite sign “Mark
is furious,” which involves retrieving the meanings of each of
the words from long-term memory (semA, semB, and semC
in Figure 1) and combining them in line with grammatical
constraints. To the extent that the meaning of a word like
“furious” includes traces of actually being furious (e.g., Foroni
and Semin, 2009; cf. Pülvermüller, 2013), retrieving that lexical-
conceptual meaning can be said to involve affective simulation.
A second and theoretically distinct subprocess that might feature
language-driven affective simulation is inferring the referential
intention of the author (or narrator), which in the case at hand
involves identifying the particular story character designated
by “Mark” in the evolving situation model for the narrative,
and updating the situation model in ways suggested by the
semantics of the predicate “is furious”. To the extent that this
situation model updating comes down to actually imagining a
furious specific character, affective simulation could be part of
the construction process (cf. Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan
and Kaschak, 2008; Zwaan, 2014).
Language-driven affective simulation can in in principle thus
feature in two different subprocesses that are needed to arrive
at a representation of what is being described in a narrative:
the representation of sign meaning, and the construction of
a situation model. According to the ALC model, affective
evaluation is something quite different, and involves how the
comprehender emotionally reacts to the various representations
that become available. This can be an evaluative response to what
is in the situation model, to the author’s (or narrator’s) inferred
stance and social intention, and to additional inferences triggered
by any of this. To return to the example, affective evaluation
reflects how the comprehender feels about such things as Mark
being furious (in the real world or a fictional one), and, in richer
real-world contexts, about why somebody is informing him or
her about this fact in a particular way. Such reactive evaluation
of what happens around us (or is talked about in, e.g., gossip or
stories) is why we have emotions in the first place.
If the neural systems involved in natural emotional evaluation
(e.g., your outrage over some situation or event) are also used
as part of such language-driven simulation (e.g., reading about
somebody else’s outrage over some situation or event), this raises
an interesting question: what happens when the same systems
are recruited to conflicting ends? The issue does not easily
come up in grounded language processing experiments that use
only single words or short sentences (e.g., “furious,” or “Mark
is furious”), because, although such simple materials afford
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FIGURE 1 | Example processing of “Mark is furious” in the Affective Language Comprehension model. Mental processes and the associated retrieved or computed
representations are expanded for addressee Y only. Y’s computational processes draw upon (and add to) long-term memory traces, and involve currently active
dynamic representations that reflect what is currently retrieved from LTM, composed from elements thereof and/or inferred from context, in response to the current
communicative move. Y’s active representations can be conscious or unconscious. For narratives presented on screen in a laboratory experiment without a
foregrounded author or narrator, stance and social intention are presumed to be irrelevant. ECS, emotionally competent stimulus; com project, communicative project.
See Van Berkum (2018a,b) for detailed explanation.
simulation, they do not necessarily elicit a lot of evaluation.
Moreover, the evaluation that is elicited by such limited stimuli
is likely to always be congruent with language-driven simulation.
However, if we scale up complexity by placing such materials
in a richer discourse context (Van Berkum, 2008; Zwaan, 2014),
evaluation may covary or conflict with simulation. Consider
again the example of reading about Mark’s car getting keyed; as
we process the language describing Mark’s anger and construct
the associated situation model, neural simulation in support of
language comprehension will result in corrugator activity that
reflects negative affect. However, if we feel that Mark is a bad
person, we may well evaluate his negative affect as something
he deserved, so as positive. While it is well-established that
Schadenfreude does in fact occur in such cases (e.g., Feather and
Nairn, 2005; Singer et al., 2006; Leach and Spears, 2009) and
that this can also influence facial muscle activity recorded using
EMG (Cikara and Fiske, 2012), to our knowledge no research
has been done on how such affective evaluation meshes with
language-driven simulation. Our experiment focuses specifically
on how the conflicting demands that affective evaluation and
language-driven affective simulation make on emotion-relevant
motor systems play out, and how that is reflected in the
corrugator activity.
In our experiment we explored the potential conflict
between language-driven simulation and emotional evaluation
by measuring corrugator activity over two critical segments in
short narratives. First, we manipulated the moral status of a
main character by having this protagonist act either morally or
immorally. Second, we manipulated a critical event where the
protagonist experiences something that is positive or negative
to them. The character morality manipulation was designed to
render the character moral (“good”) or immoral (“bad”) to the
average reader, and to as such create the basis for a differential,
character-dependent moral evaluation of subsequent good or
bad critical events befalling the character. We assumed that
good events happening to moral characters would primarily be
evaluated as fair and lead to corresponding positive emotions
(e.g., a sense of justice), whereas bad events happening to those
characters would primarily be evaluated as unfair and lead
to corresponding negative emotions (e.g., moral indignation,
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TABLE 1 | Example narrative, also illustrating trial structure and timing.
Baseline Neutral distractor image 3 s
Introduction Mark is driving through the pouring rain, on his way to his mother. He’s still in the inner city and big
puddles have formed. It’s been raining non-stop since yesterday. Some streets are practically flooded.
There are few cars on the road and fewer bicycles and pedestrians still. Mark is headed for a giant
puddle and spots a pedestrian on the sidewalk.
18 s
Character Morality (moral/immoral) Mark slows down to avoid
the puddle, making sure he
doesn’t splash the
pedestrian.
OR Mark accelerates through
the puddle on purpose to
create a big splash and
soak the pedestrian.
5 s
Continuation Once outside the city he is driving along on the freeway. There still isn’t a lot of traffic and Mark is
enjoying the landscape and the drive. He’s got the radio on full blast and sings along loudly. When he
glances at the dashboard to adjust the channel he spots a warning light. He forgot to put petrol in the
car and has been running on empty for a while.
15 s
Critical Event (positive/negative for the
character)
Mark is happy when he
immediately spots a petrol
station and he avoids being
stranded.
OR Mark is frustrated when
there isn’t a petrol station in
sight and he becomes
stranded by the roadside.
5 s
Press “space” to continue to the next story
anger, pity). Critically, we assumed that how readers evaluate
those same events would change dramatically when these events
would befall immoral characters, with good events happening to
those characters primarily evaluated as unfair, leading to related
negative emotions (e.g., moral indignation, anger, irritation), and
bad events happening to those characters primarily evaluated
as fair, leading to positive emotions (e.g., Schadenfreude, a
“serves-you-right” sense of justice). In Table 1 above, an example
narrative illustrates the design of our study, as well as the specific
timing of presenting the various fragments.
On the assumption that participants are in a neutral or
otherwise moderate affective state as they read the introduction,
our predictions for corrugator activity at the subsequent
character morality segment are straightforward: increased
corrugator activity (frowning) for immoral actions, but a
decrease for moral actions (relaxation). Although also of interest
in itself, such a differential response would above all suggest that
the character morality manipulation was successful, and that the
stage would be set for subsequent events.
The critical predictions concern what happens when readers
subsequently read about good or bad events befalling the
character. With moral characters, negative events are expected
to clearly increase corrugator activity, because of a negatively
valenced simulation of the character’s state, a negatively valenced
evaluation by the reader, or a combination of the two. For
similar reasons, positive events befalling moral characters are
expected to relax the corrugator, because of a positively valenced
simulation, a positively valenced evaluation, or both. With
immoral characters, however, simulation and evaluation valence
will conflict, at least for the average reader: something bad
happening to an immoral character is negative for the character
but positive for the reader, and something good happening to
an immoral character is positive for the character but negative
for the reader. Hence, with immoral characters, language-driven
simulation should in principle recruit the neural systems that
control the corrugator to simulate one valence (positive or
negative) while evaluation should in principle recruit those same
systems to express the opposite valence. The outcome of this
conflict is the main focus of the experiment.
Based on the ALC model, we considered three possible
accounts to predict corrugator activity at the critical event,
schematically depicted in Figure 2. The first is one where,
during narrative fiction reading, language-driven simulation
totally captures the corrugator, and does not reflect evaluation.
This simulation-only account predicts that even in the face
of oppositely valenced evaluation (i.e., good or bad things
befalling an immoral protagonist), corrugator activity would
simply show the simulation involved in constructing a situation
model (imagining the protagonist as frustrated or happy) and/or
the simulation of lexical meaning (“frustrated,” “happy”) in
the service of such construction. We deem this account rather
unlikely, in part because of the evolutionary significance of
narrative in moral and other social-affective evaluations (notably
in gossip, Dunbar, 2004), and because of the roles that affective
evaluation and the accompanying overt facial expressions play
in socially responding to interpersonal narrative (with facial
expression usually seen as a constituent of such emotion, see Van
Berkum, 2018a,b). Furthermore, as simulation is itself grounded
in such primary affective evaluation, it would be peculiar to
predict that in language comprehension, simulation prevails over
“the real thing.” We include the simulation-only account as a
logical possibility, though, in part because it can be taken to
represent the tacit assumption made in much grounded language
processing research.
The second account under consideration holds that, in line
with the role of narrative (e.g., gossip) in moral evaluation,
the emotional response to the perceived fairness of the event
completely captures the corrugator such that the neural systems
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FIGURE 2 | Three possible arrangements of how language-driven affective simulation and evaluation drive the corrugator muscle.
controlling it are no longer available for language-driven
simulation of lexical meaning or a character’s emotion. This
evaluation-blocks-simulation account predicts that the moral
status of the protagonist determines the ultimate evaluative
valence of a critical event in terms of fairness, causing the
corrugator responses to critical events to “flip” when those events
befall immoral rather thanmoral characters. For instance, relative
to positive events, negative events should lead to increased
corrugator activity (i.e., negative affect) when they happen to
a morally good character, but to decreased corrugator activity
(i.e., positive affect) when they happen to a bad character. This
account makes the reasonable assumption that, although the
neural systems that control facial muscles might be free for
simulating emotion as long as people don’t care about what
they read, those systems will immediately be recruited in the
service of real evaluative emotion as soon as a narrative describes
something worthy of evaluation.
The third account we consider is one in which evaluation
and simulation both determine corrugator activity. Thismultiple-
drivers account predicts that simulation and evaluation both
leave traces in the activity of the corrugator as indexed by EMG.
Because the drivers may interact in ways that are difficult to lay
out in advance, the exact pattern of results is hard to predict. The
one clear prediction, though, is that the corrugator EMG patterns
cannot be explained in terms of one of the simplermodels laid out
before.
The strength of the effects hypothesized under these three
accounts could arguably vary as a result of individual differences.
We included two questionnaires that measure the tendency of
people to experience emotions in response to narratives and their
tendency to empathize and/or sympathize with the emotions of
others. For the former we use the Transportability questionnaire
(Dal Cin et al., 2004), measuring the degree to which people
are readily transported into narratives. Research shows that
transportation influences, among other things, the intensity of
our emotional experience of a narrative (e.g., Green et al., 2004).
The second questionnaire, the Adolescent Measure of Empathy
and Sympathy (AMES; Vossen et al., 2015), measures three
components of pro-social emotion: affective empathy (“feeling
what another feels”), cognitive empathy (“understanding what
another feels”), and sympathy (“feeling for the other”).
METHODS
Participants
Sixty students (47 female, age range 18–30, M = 21.08,
SD = 3.43) recruited from the participant pool of the UiL OTS
participated in exchange for financial compensation (e 12,-). All
participants were native speakers of Dutch, without a diagnosis
of dyslexia, without Botox injections in the face and with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. At the time this research was
conducted, the research institute where it took place did not
yet have an Ethics Committee (Institutional Review Board),
and institute guidelines did not require any other formal ethics
approval. Because there is no medical aim involved, the research
at hand also did not fall under the scope of national legislation
requiring medical ethics review (The Dutch WMO, Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects Act). Research procedures
complied with The Netherlands Code of Conduct for Academic
Practice, as well as with the Declaration of Helsinki. In line with
the latter, all of our participants gave written informed consent,
based on an elaborate informed consent form detailing the nature
of the materials and the procedure, and emphasizing their right
to withdraw consent at any time during the experiment without
being required to provide a reason, and without losing their
right to financial compensation. The informed consent form (in
Dutch) is available upon request from the corresponding author.
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Design
Our experiment had a 2× 2 design: CharacterMorality (moral vs.
immoral) and Critical Event (positive vs. negative). The design
was fully crossed and implemented within subjects. Our main
dependent variable was corrugator supercilii activity.We included
measures of individual differences concerning transportability
and empathy and sympathy as possible factors that would
influence the effect our manipulations had on corrugator activity.




Sixty-four short narratives were created for the experiment
according to the structure outlined in Table 1 above, each in
four variants based on our 2 × 2 (morality x event) design. The
character morality manipulation was pre-tested in a different
group of 38 students (35 female), recruited from the same
participant pool and similar to the experiment group. The
pre-test participants were divided into two groups and each
read half (32) of the stories up to and including the moral
manipulation. They were first asked to rate, on a 7-point
scale, how prosocial (1) or antisocial (7) the actions of the
protagonist were, and, second, how expected (1) or unexpected
(7) the actions of the protagonist were. Moral actions were
considered more prosocial (M = 1.69, SD = 1.04) than
immoral actions (M = 5.99, SD = 1.04). Moral actions were also
considered slightly more expected (M = 3.17, SD = 1.57) than
immoral ones (M = 5.16, SD = 1.56). In the experiment, each
narrative was preceded by a baseline measure which included the
presentation of a neutral distractor image of a path in a forest.
The reason for including an image rather than, for instance, a
fixation cross was to reduce the degree to which participants’
minds would wander and thus skew the baseline facial EMG
recording.
We created four pseudorandomized stimulus lists with
64 narratives each, such that (a) every narrative occurred
once in one of four variants in each list, (b) participants
would see 16 narratives in each of the four conditions, 8
with a male and 8 with a female protagonist, (c) average
item properties in each list were similar in terms of pro-
sociality (and expectedness as its inevitable correlate, (d) two
lists had the reverse order of two other lists, and (e) each
narrative occurred with both male and female protagonists
across the four different lists, with the exception of 9
narratives that had fixed gender due to stereotypical behavioral
expectations. Dutch stimulus materials are available upon
request.
Questionnaires Individual Differences
We included a Transportability questionnaire (Dal Cin et al.,
2004), measuring the degree to which people are readily
transported into narratives through agreement (on a scale of
1–9) with statements such as such as “I find I can easily lose
myself in the story” and “I am often emotionally affected by what
I’ve read.” The second questionnaire, the Adolescent Measure of
Empathy and Sympathy (AMES; Vossen et al., 2015)1, measures
three components of pro-social emotion: affective empathy (e.g.,
“when a friend is angry about something, I become angry too”),
cognitive empathy (e.g., “I can tell when a friend is angry, even
when he/she tries to hide it”), and sympathy (e.g., “I feel bad for
a friend when he/she is sad”).
Procedure and Data Acquisition
After reading and signing an informed consent form, participants
received verbal instructions. With regards to the reading of the
stimuli, they were instructed to read them silently as they would
when reading a book. They were not given specific instruction
about what to look for or pay attention to. In a separate room,
stimuli were presented on a screen at a distance of approximately
60 cm. Stimuli were presented in automatically timed segments
as outlined in Table 1, in white Times New Roman (24 pt.) on
a black background. Participants read 64 narratives in total,
preceded by 2 practice trials. Presentation rate of trials was self-
paced by pressing space bar between stories with two fixed longer
pauses during the experiment. Facial EMG activity was measured
using reusable Ag/AgCl electrodes with a 2mm contact area over
corrugator and zygomaticus muscles on the right side of the
face (van Boxtel, 2010). We included the zygomaticus (smiling)
muscle to afford compatibility with previous studies addressing
emotional valence. However, as Larsen et al. (2003) note, the
zygomaticus does not reflect emotional valence in the same two-
directional way that the corrugator does. The same study also
showed that zygomaticus was less reliable as an indicator of
valence in the case of linguistic stimuli.Wewould add to this that,
especially in more complex environments such as our narrative
stimuli, smiling activity may be difficult to interpret: smiles can
be wry, sarcastic, and smirking as well as expressions of true
positive feeling. We therefore focus on the corrugator, and report
the zygomaticus data in Supplementary Figure 1 for reference.
Raw EMG signals were recorded with a NeXus-10MKII biosignal
system (Mind Media) at a sampling rate of 2,048Hz. After
finishing this part of the experiment, electrodes were removed,
participants moved to a laptop to fill out the questionnaires, and
finally received their payment. Although, due to time-constraints,
no comprehension questions were included, answers given in the
exit-questionnaire indicated participants had in fact paid close
attention to the stories.
Data Preparation and Analysis
EMG Data
The raw data were band-pass filtered between 20 and 500Hz (48
dB/octave roll-off) and were additionally filtered with a notch
filter at 50Hz (see van Boxtel, 2010 for justification of filter
parameters), followed by signal rectification and segmentation
per narrative, all in BrainVision Analyzer 2. For each narrative,
1We prefer the AMES over alternative empathy questionnaires (such as the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Davis, 1983) because it separates cognitive and
affective empathy in a more principled way (see Vossen et al., 2015, for discussion).
Although originally targeting adolescents, the items that make up the AMES
scales are appropriate for our relative young (student population) age group, and,
importantly, scoring does not involve norming scores relative to an adolescent
score distribution (p. 8).
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the 3,000ms before story onset, consisting of the presentation
of a neutral distractor image of a forest scene, were inspected
for remaining artifacts. We selected maximally long continuous
baseline epochs, with the requirement of a minimum of 500ms of
artifact-free signal for both muscles simultaneously. Trials were
excluded if such a 500ms baseline epoch could not be found (data
loss of 0.50%).
Following baseline selection, data were exported to MatLab
and then further segmented in two epochs of 5,000ms, time-
locked to the onsets of the character morality and critical event
segments in each story. Next, the data for both the character
morality segment and the critical event segment were divided
into 50 consecutive 100ms bins for optimal temporal resolution
and reduction of random error, with the average EMG response
in each bin expressed as a percentage of the pre-story baseline
epoch (expressing responses as a percentage of baseline helps
reduce random variance both within and between individuals;
van Boxtel, 2010). Supplementary Figure 2 shows continuous
average activation in 100ms bins for an entire trial.
We performed a Mixed Models Linear Regression analysis
(using SPSS version 24) for both critical segments. Rather than
simply looking at average activation over the whole segment, we
built a growth curve model that also captured linear, quadratic
and cubic trends in the signal (Peck and Devore, 2008; Mirman,
2014; trend components were centered to avoid correlation
between trend components). Using three trend components gives
us two flex points and allows us to describe a response in some
detail while retaining interpretability and avoiding over-fitting, as
every extra flex point will make it easier to fit the data (Mirman,
2014). Models were fitted with 100-ms resolution, but for ease of
comprehension, parameter estimates (e.g., a b for a linear slope)
will be reported per second. Note that while we do not report
effect size metrics, our parameter estimates reflect percentages
and as such already give an indication of the size of the effect of a
given predictor.
Rather than as one variable, we included separate trend
components for each condition and added these iteratively. For
each condition (moral & immoral for character manipulation
and moral-pos/neg & immoral-pos/neg for critical event) we
generated separate variables for linear, quadratic, and cubic
trends. This allowed us to achieve maximal modeling flexibility
without forcing the model to fit, for instance, a quadratic
trend for all conditions when only some contained a significant
quadratic component.
The model included subjects and items over lists as random
intercepts, and random slopes for the trend components on the
subject factor, but in the Results we only report (comparisons
on the) linear component. We added predictors iteratively and
used the −2LL chi-square test of model fit to assess whether
each added factor improved themodel (p< 0.05). Supplementary
Information A contains the complete model summaries. The
estimates of fixed effects reported in the results section belong
to the final best-fit models.
Questionnaire Data
For the transportability questionnaire, we calculated a basic total
score over all questions ranging from 20 to 180 (cronbach’s α in
the current data set= 0.860). The AMES questionnaire contained
three subscales each ranging from 1 to 5: affective empathy
(cronbach’s α in the current data set= 0.797), cognitive empathy
(cronbach’s α = 0.869), and sympathy (cronbach’s α = 0.639).
We thus calculated the averages for each subscale based on the
original authors’ validation study (Vossen et al., 2015).
To analyse the individual differences, we used the mixed
models procedure again, but without the growth curve to avoid
overcomplicating the analysis with four-way interactions. As
the individual differences were of secondary interest for our
main research question, the analysis we employed here was
simplified. We immediately tested for the effect of each trait on
average corrugator activation over the entire 5,000ms of each of
the manipulated segments, as well as the interaction with our
conditions. Individual differences were entered as covariates in
the fixed part of the model. We did not explore interactions
between individual differences (e.g., between transportability and
affective empathy) as we had no a priori reasons to do so.
RESULTS
Character Morality Manipulation
As can be seen in Figure 3, reading about moral and immoral
actions elicited a clearly differential corrugator response2. For
moral actions we saw a gradual and modest decrease in activity.
In contrast, we found a rapid and substantial increase in
corrugator activity starting within the first second in response
to immoral actions of the main character. Statistical analysis
corroborated these observations. First, the fixed effects revealed
an effect of character morality, with immoral actions leading
to higher activation than moral actions (difference b = 29.46,
t(26.42) = 13.02, p < 0.001, 95% CI of [25.00, 33.91])
3.
Furthermore, whereas moral actions induced a significant linear
decrease in corrugator activity (b = −1.79, t(59.99) = −4.02,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [−2.69, −0.90]), the regression for immoral
actions included a significant linear increase in corrugator
activity (b = 15.14, t(59.97) = 4.55, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [8.48,
21.80]), with both linear trends also differing significantly from
each other (p < 0.001; all slope estimates per second). This is in
line with our predictions that moral actions would elicit positive
affect and immoral actions would elicit negative affect. It also
suggests that the stage was effectively set for our subsequent
critical event manipulation. For a complete report of the results,
see Supplementary Information A.
Critical Event Manipulation
Figure 4 below shows the results for the critical event
manipulation: something positive or negative befalling the
2The corrugator responses in Figure 3 start slightly above the 100% baseline level.
We suspect this reflects the additional effort demanded by reading the preceding
introduction segment of the narratives, in comparison with passive viewing of the
preceding neutral image (p. 13).
3Because our growth curve analysis used centered time components, the intercept
in our analyses represents the average activation over the entire time window,
rather than the point where the curves leave the Y-axis. Furthermore, whereas the
reported intercepts are based on fixed effects in the final model only, the fitted line
in Figure 3 includes both the fixed effects and the random effects from the model
(p. 13).
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FIGURE 3 | Observed averages of corrugator response during character morality segment, with growth curve model regression overlaid.
FIGURE 4 | Observed averages of corrugator response to critical events befalling moral and immoral characters, with growth curve model regression overlaid.
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character. Our predictions concerned the effect of the character
morality on the valence of the corrugator response, in relation
to the valence of the event. We will therefore discuss the critical
events separately for moral and immoral characters.
Moral Characters
The corrugator response to critical events happening to moral
characters revealed a clear differential pattern for positive and
negative events (see Figure 4, squares and solid lines), with
negative events eliciting an increase in corrugator activity, and
positive events leading to a decrease in activity. This pattern
was corroborated by statistical analysis. For moral characters,
negative events elicited significantly stronger mean corrugator
activation than positive events (moral-negative - moral-positive
difference: b = 21.11, t(272.33) = 8.19, p < 0.001, 95% CI of
[16.03, 26.18]), and also resulted in clearly different temporal
developments. In particular, whereas the model regression for
moral-negative contained a linear increase in activation (b= 3.60,
t(95.84) = 3.20, p = 0.01, 95% CI of [1.37, 5.84]), moral-positive
conditions led to a linear decrease in activation (b = −2.58,
t(59.74) = −4.54, p < 0.001, 95% CI [−3.71, −1.44]). Note, all
slope estimates are reported per second. A pairwise comparison
of these linear trends also revealed they differed significantly at
the p < 0.001 level.
Although these different corrugator results reflect a difference
in valence of the critical event, the data at this point do not allow
us to say whether the corrugator response here reflects language-
driven simulation, moral evaluation, or a mixture of the two.
This is because in the case of moral characters, simulation and
evaluation predict the same valence for the corrugator response.
To illustrate, language describing a negative event befalling a
moral character would involve simulation of negative concepts
or negative character emotions in the situationmodel and as such
lead to increased corrugator activity. By the same token however,
the evaluation of a negative event befalling a good character
as unfair would also lead to increased corrugator activity. Our
design included the immoral character conditions to pull these
potential drivers of the corrugator response apart.
Immoral Characters
The corrugator response for immoral-positive and immoral-
negative conditions (see Figure 4, triangles and dashed lines)
presented a very different picture from that for the moral
characters. At first glance, the immoral conditions did not show
a clear valenced response at all. The statistical model confirmed
this impression. With immoral characters, mean corrugator
activity did not significantly depend on whether a positive or
negative event occurred (immoral-positive - immoral-negative
difference: b = 1.37, t(272.40) = 0.53, p = 0.60, 95% CI [−3.71,
6.44]). Furthermore, although including linear and quadratic
components for both positive and negative events befalling
characters significantly improved the model, none of the linear
and quadratic estimates themselves significantly different from
zero (see Supplementary Information A). In all, the statistics
indicate a flat-line corrugator response in both cases and no
significant difference between the two.
These results do not sit well with the simulation-only account
(which predicted similar corrugator effects of negative vs. positive
events regardless of protagonist status), nor with the evaluation-
blocks-simulation account (which predicted that the pattern of
corrugator activation would track fairness, and hence flip for bad
protagonists, relative to good protagonists). Because the results
cannot easily be explained in either of these simple models, they
suggest that some version of the multiple-drivers account, where
both language-driven simulation and moral evaluation exerted
control over the corrugator, is appropriate here. We will explore
this further in the Discussion section.
Individual Differences
We analyzed the individual differences by entering each
personality trait as a continuous covariate in the fixed part of
a simplified model which included morality and critical event,
but excluded linear, quadratic and cubic trends (see section
Methods). The personality traits included Cognitive Empathy
(M = 3.54, range = 2.17–4.83) Affective Empathy (M = 3.01,
range = 1.60–4.00) Sympathy (M = 3.86, range = 2.5–4.75)
and Transportability (M = 73.19, range = 39–132). Our models
revealed that only Affective Empathy and Transportability
significantly modulated corrugator activity (see Supplementary
Information B).
At the character morality segment, Affective Empathy scores
only had an effect on corrugator activity elicited by immoral
actions (b = 16.16, t(61.74) = 3.46, p < 0.001, 95% CI [6.84,
25.48]), with higher Affective Empathy scores associated with
more negative affect. At the same segment, Transportability also
modulated the corrugator responses elicited by immoral actions
only (b = −0.55, t(62.05) = −3.42, p < 0.001, 95% CI [−0.87,
−0.23]), with higher Transportability scores associated with
less negative affect. Affective Empathy and Transportation thus
seemed to have the opposite effect on frowning activity during
immoral actions. Because Affective Empathy and Transportation
scores themselves were negatively correlated [r(58) = −0.17,
p(two−tailed) < 0.001], their impact on corrugator activity may
not be independent. Corrugator activity to moral actions did
not show a significant effect of either Affective Empathy scores
(p= 0.40) or Transportation scores (p= 0.54).
At the critical event segment, we found that in the moral-
negative condition (bad things happening to good people)
higher Affective Empathy scores once again resulted in more
corrugator activity (b = 9.17, t(62.72) = 2.36, p = 0.02, 95%
CI [1.39, 16.95]), indicating that those higher in Affective
Empathy clearly exhibited more negative affect in response to
the character experiencing a negative emotion. Furthermore, we
found the same relationship between corrugator activity and
Affective Empathy for the immoral-positive condition (b = 8.61,
t(62.78) = 2.21, p= 0.03, 95% CI [0.82, 16.39]). As both conditions
can be considered to involve an evaluation in terms of unfairness,
a parsimonious explanation might be that those predisposed to
feel what others feel display more negative affect particularly
in cases of unfairness, an account that can also explain the
Affective Empathy effect on corrugator responding to the first
immoral action of the character. At the critical event segment,
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Transportation scores did not co-vary with corrugator activity in
any of the conditions (see Supplementary Information B).
DISCUSSION
Using a recent model of affective language comprehension (Van
Berkum, 2018a,b) as our guide, this study pitted language-driven
simulation against moral evaluation using narratives containing a
protagonist manipulated to be moral or immoral. We used EMG
to measure the response of the corrugator muscle as an indicator
of these two processes. For the character morality manipulation
(e.g., “Mark slows down/accelerates. . . ”), we expected that the
corrugator response would clearly reflect moral valence. This
prediction was borne out by our results: relative to a pre-story
baseline, participants frowned more at immoral actions and less
at moral actions, with the difference between the two emerging
relatively rapidly, in less than a second after presentation of the
critical sentence. This adds to existing evidence that facial EMG
recordings in general, and that of the corrugator in particular,
can help track responses to affectively loaded language (e.g.,
Foroni and Semin, 2009, 2013; Glenberg et al., 2009; Niedenthal
et al., 2009), and extends that evidence to a new domain, the
processing of morally loaded language (e.g., Van Berkum et al.,
2009; Leuthold et al., 2015, for EEG indications of very rapid
processing of such language).
The character morality manipulation was crucial to untangle
the two possible drivers behind the corrugator response at
the subsequent critical event (e.g., “Mark was happy/frustrated
when. . . ”). Here, the presence of immoral characters led to
conflicting valence predictions depending on whether language-
driven simulation or fairness-based moral evaluation drove the
corrugator response, both in the immoral-negative condition (a
bad person befalls something bad, i.e., negative for the character
but fair in the eyes of the reader) and the immoral-positive
condition (a bad person befalls something good, i.e., positive
for the character but unfair in the eyes of the reader). We
considered three accounts of how corrugator activity might
reflect this conflict during the critical event manipulation:
(1) the corrugator response might simply track the valence
of language-driven simulation of the event (simulation-only
account), (2) the corrugator response would reflect only fairness-
based moral evaluation (evaluation-blocks-simulation account),
or (3) language-driven simulation and moral evaluation would
both drive the corrugator response (multiple-drivers account).
Because the observed pattern of corrugator activity radically
depends on the moral status of the protagonist, our data
clearly refute a simple simulation-only account, according
to which corrugator responses to phrases such as “Mark
was frustrated/happy” merely reflect generic situation-model
building (imagining the protagonist as frustrated or happy)
and/or simulating lexical-conceptual meaning (“frustrated”,
“happy”) in the service of such construction. We already
considered this account rather unlikely, in part because socially
important uses of narrative in human exchanges, such as gossip,
can only work if moral evaluation does not shut down when
people process language (Dunbar, 2004). Of course, when reading
fictional narratives in the lab, real social relations are not at stake
and evaluative responses therefore might well be attenuated.
Given that moral evaluation is to a large extent automatic
(Greene, 2014), however, it is unlikely that it would be eliminated
in the lab. Our corrugator data at the critical event confirm
this idea of automatic moral evaluation, as does the large and
rapid corrugator response to a moral transgression earlier in the
narrative.
Our results also refute the more plausible evaluation-
blocks-simulation account, which had predicted the corrugator
responses to critical events to “flip” as a function of whether
the protagonist had just behaved morally (stronger corrugator
activity for negative events than positive events) or immorally
(stronger corrugator activity for positive events than negative
events). This is not what our data show: whereas negative events
lead to considerably more corrugator activity than positive events
when those events befell a morally laudable person, there was no
difference in corrugator activity between positive and negative
events befalling immoral characters. The results displayed in
Figure 4 are thus best accounted for in terms of amultiple-drivers
account, where both language-driven simulation of events (as
part of lexical retrieval and/or situation model construction) and
the evaluation of those events (i.e., the reader’s own emotions)
simultaneously recruit the neural systems driving the corrugator,
at least with the materials studied here.
How those two drivers interact exactly is as yet an open
question, constrained neither by our data nor by the ALC model
that we used to formulate predictions. One possibility is that
in the case of immoral characters, the corrugator activations
associated with language-driven simulation andmoral evaluation
cancel each other out. In this version of the multiple-drivers
account, the corrugator increase due to, say, simulating a
frustrated protagonist and/or retrieving the associated lexical
semantics would then need to be leveled out by a corrugator
decrease related to the positive affect associated with evaluating
this state of affairs as fair (e.g., a “serves-you-right” sense
of justice, Schadenfreude) in case this protagonist previously
behaved immorally. Likewise, with an immoral protagonist, the
corrugator decrease due to simulating his or her happiness
and/or retrieving the associated lexical semantics would then
need to be leveled out by a corrugator increase related to the
negative affect associated with evaluating this particular outcome
as unfair (a sense of moral indignation, anger, etc.)4.
Corrugator EMG has also been linked to ease of processing
or mental effort (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1985; Cohen et al., 1992;
Topolinski et al., 2009) where enhanced corrugator activity is
indicative of increased effort and less fluency in processing.
At first glance, this may seem to be a potential confound for
our results. However, the immoral conditions are arguably the
most complicated because evaluation in these cases involves a
reassessment of the valence of the event in light of the character’s
moral status. Yet, for these conditions we do not find any phasic
increase in corrugator actvity at the critical event. In fact, the
4Although such exact cancelation may feel somewhat “coincidental,” we note that
this outcome is as likely as any specific partial cancelation, such as when the impact
of evaluation is twice that of the counteracting impact of simulation (p. 20).
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only time corrugator EMG increases during the critical event
is when good characters experience a negative event, arguably
a fairly uncomplicated case. As such, complexity or disfluency
in processing does not offer a parsimonious explanation for the
patterns we found during the critical event segment.
An alternative account that we cannot as yet fully rule
out relates to the concept of identification. Identification with
characters is often assumed to involve the reader taking on the
character’s goals and values as their own and experiencing the
emotions of the character (Oatley, 1995). While the ALC model
does not discuss mechanisms of identification, they could in
the context of that model be reframed in terms of selective,
context-dependent simulation at the level of the situation model,
i.e. of simulating the emotions of certain protagonists, but not
those of others. There is evidence for a connection between
character likeability and identification (Tian and Hoffner, 2010;
Chory, 2013) and reduced self-reported experience of positive
and negative emotions in response to characters that readers
identified with less (Hoeken and Sinkeldam, 2014). More
generally, the emotional charge of the context appears to affect
both what and how much is simulated (Samur et al., 2015).
If readers only simulate the emotions of likable characters
and not those of disliked characters, a result such as in
Figure 4 is conceivable. To explain our corrugator findings
for immoral characters with this “selective simulation” account
alone, however, one would also need to assume that readers
do not morally evaluate what they read or hear, at least not in
the case of events befalling immoral characters. With morally
loaded narrative, and for reasons discussed before, we deem such
absence ofmoral evaluation highly unlikely. Also, more generally,
we find it unlikely that motor control programs that evolved to
express one’s own emotion are merely used to simulate other
people’s emotions, and not used to express ones own emotion
over rather eventful social matters. If this were the case, people
would for example not be able to facially express, to each other,
their emotional alignment over a piece of gossip, or some other
narrative about what happened to them or others.
As for follow-up experiments on the interplay between
simulation and evaluation, note that the ALC model makes
explicit two different potential loci for affective simulation
with language comprehension, which can in principle be
independently manipulated via, e.g., negation (“Mark was not
furious”). Crossing such a simulation-type manipulation with
evaluation might help in teasing out which precise aspect(s)
of affective simulation co-occur with affective evaluation. One
possible scenario is that whereas simulation that is part of
conceptual retrieval is obligatory and as such not blocked
by evaluation, the simulation involved in situation model
construction might be tuned down or blocked altogether (cf.
Zwaan, 2014).
It would also be useful to obtain more precise evidence on
how the corrugator response unfolds relative to crucial words
in the unfolding sentence. Our critical sentences were presented
as a whole in our current study, so it is not exactly known
when critical words like frustrated or happy were read by the
participants. More precise time-locking to words like happy or
frustrated might thus reveal an initial purely simulation-driven
corrugator response, rapidly followed by an evaluative or mixed
response. Furthermore, our critical events can be said to consist
of two components: an adjective which signals the valence of
the emotional state of the character (e.g., happy vs. frustrated),
and a clause describing the reason for this state (e.g., when there
isn’t a petrol station in sight and. . . ). Presenting the latter part of
the stimulus a little later than the adjective would allow us to
observe the separate EMG response to either. A more precisely
time-locked version of the same experiment with a more fine-
grained control of when specific information becomes available
might thus help to differentiate the respective contributions of
simulation and evaluation to the unfolding corrugator EMG
signal.
The effects of Affective Empathy suggest that the corrugator
response to morally loaded narrative is also subject to some
individual variation. At the character morality manipulation,
readers with a higher Affective Empathy score frowned more at
immoral actions, and at the critical event manipulation, those
readers frowned more in response to bad things happening to
good characters as well as to good things happening to bad
characters. A reasonable post hoc interpretation is that people
who are by habit or constitution more predisposed to feel what
others feel are also particularly responsive to unfairness, rather
than fairness. Furthermore, we found that readers with higher
Transportability scores responded less to descriptions of immoral
actions than those with lower scores. This could be taken to
suggest that moral judgment of narratives decreases when a
reader is more immersed in the narrative, perhaps because of
a shift in the balance between evaluation and simulation. As
Transportability correlated negatively with Affective Empathy in
our sample, these effects might not be independent of each other.
While these results provide food for thought, the evidence is
correlational, andmust as such be approached with great caution.
In all, and independent of which precise variant of the
multiple-drivers account will ultimately account for them,
our results suggest that moral evaluation has powerful effects
on corrugator activity during narrative language processing:
sentences containing affective information such as “Mark is
furious when. . . ” and “Mark is happy when. . . ” generate quite
different corrugator EMG responses as a function of whether
the protagonist has just displayed morally good or objectionable
behavior. We take this result to reflect the reader’s direct and
rapid moral evaluation of, and associated emotional response
to, what is being narrated, both when reading about downright
moral or immoral behavior, and when reading about events
that befall the characters at hand. The implication is that
corrugator activity during language processing does not merely
reflect simulation of the protagonist’s emotion (e.g., Mark being
frustrated) and/or of lexical-semantic meaning (e.g., retrieval
of the meaning of frustrated). The fact that people have
emotions about other people’s emotions co-determines how their
corrugator responds as they read a story about those other people.
Although the traces of affect picked up via facial EMG
over the corrugator may often not be visible in the face
(Tassinary and Cacioppo, 1992), corrugator EMG recordings
show us that readers quite literally frown upon descriptions
of characters behaving immorally and that the moral status
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of characters drastically influences corrugator activity during
later affectively salient passages. This result highlights the
importance of unpacking coarse notions of affective meaning
in language processing research into components that reflect
not only simulation but also evaluation. In line with a central
tenet of the Affective Language Comprehension model, our
corrugator EMG results here also call for a re-evaluation of
the “simple” interpretation of corrugator EMG (and other
affect-related facial muscles) and other peripheral physiological
measures as unequivocal indicators of simulation in affective
language processing. Further exploration is needed of how such
measures behave in a richer and more ecologically valid language
processing arena, such as narrative. Such work would benefit
the field by refining our understanding of the role of simulation
processes within a framework of grounded cognition in general
and language comprehension in particular.
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